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Abstract: 
A Radiological Dispersive Device (RDD) spreads radioactive material, 
complicates the treatment of physical injuries, raises cancer risk and 
induces disproportionate fear. Simulating such an event enables more 
effective and efficient utilization of the triage and treatment resources of 
staff, facilities and space. Fast simulation can give detail on events in 
progress, or future events. The resources for triage and treatment of 
contaminated trauma victims can differ to those for pure exposure 
individuals, whilst discouraging the ‘worried well’ from presenting in the 
crisis phase by media announcement would relieve pressure on hospital 
facilities. The proposed methodology integrates capabilities from different 
platforms in a convergent way composed of three phases: (a) scenario 
simulation; (b) data generation and (c) risk assessment for triage focused 
on follow up epidemiological assessment. Simulations typically indicate that 
most of the affected population does not require immediate medical 
assistance. Medical triage for the few severely injured and the radiological 
triage to diminish the contamination with radioactivity will always be the 
priority. For this study, however, higher priorities should be given to 
individuals from radiological ‘warm’ and ‘hot’ zones as required by risk 
criteria. The proposed methodology could thus help to: (a) filter and 
reduce the number of individuals to be attended; (b) optimize the 
prioritization of medical care; (c) reduce or prepare for future costs (d) 
effectively locate the operational triage site to avoid possible contamination 
on the main facility and (e) provide the scientific data needed to develop 
an adequate approach to risk and its proper communication. 
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Introduction 
 
 Ionizing radiation is widely used and brings great benefits to various industrial 
and health care services ranging from radiography and diagnostics to sterilization and 
brachytherapy. However, the widespread use of radioactive materials leads to occasions 
of accidental dissemination and radiation exposure, and the potential for theft and 
misuse. Although the number of immediate mortalities is usually very small in such 
events, the number of potentially exposed individuals to be screened is relatively high. 
Consequently, optimizing radiological emergency responses might require special 
technical procedures to ensure safety. Special emphasis should be placed on the 
radiological triage of potentially exposed individuals. This has been found to be an 
important, cumbersome and delicate activity that must be meticulously performed by 
the occupational health team, which normally heads the process of triage, playing 
critical roles such as screening and first aids to victims. It is thus expected from 
occupational health teams to anticipate possible hazards, facilitating safety decisions 
(Reissman and Howard, 2008). Thus, health team should be familiarized with the 
effects of ionizing radiation on humans and have some understanding of crisis 
management tools to efficiently coordinate actions to safely control the situation. 
 Radioactive material could be dispersed by fire or explosions in places where 
strong radiation sources exist such as where food, medical instruments or blood are 
sterilized. However, criminals and terrorists may intentionally cause human harm and 
disruption with a Radiological Dispersive Device (RDD) by spreading radioactive 
material in the environment. Typically, an RDD is an explosive device coupled with 
radioactive material. The explosion adds an immediate threat to human life and property 
beyond the probable main purpose of the RDD (Saint Yves et al., 2012). The 
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combination of blast injuries and radiological contamination can be problematic if 
procedures to address blast and radiation have only been considered separately. In most 
plausible scenarios, exposure to radioactive material will not result in the large doses 
associated to radiation sickness. The primary health concern regarding the public should 
then be the increased risk of cancer to exposed individuals. Furthermore, hazards from 
fire, radioactive smoke, shrapnel from explosion, and other chemical or biological 
agents could also be initially included in the list of major sources of risk. In addition, 
they are also expected to impact the triage phase of response. 
 The HotSpot Health Physics code was used to simulate an intentional 
radioactive dispersion caused by detonation of a radiological (non-nuclear) dispersive 
device (RDD). A typical RDD uses conventional explosives to spread radioactive 
material, creating contamination and terrorism (Ring, 2004; Saint Yves et al., 2012). For 
solid cancers, high doses are necessary to increase the risk significantly above the 
spontaneous risk, however, for leukemia high relative risks may occur even at low doses 
(IAEA, 1996). For this reason, the epidemiologic model for leukemia recommended by 
the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation V committee (BEIR V) (Hendee, 1992) was 
used for risk limits calculations. 
Medical attention to injured individuals exposed to radioactive materials can be 
complex. However, in a typical RDD scenario, the number of individuals exposed to 
high levels of radiation is not expected to be high (Akashi et al., 2001; Mettler, 2012).  
The focus of this study is not exclusively the immediate response to an RDD 
scenario. It extends to how the early response enables people to be grouped according to 
their long-term risk of the stochastic effects of cancer, and how this can be used to 
optimize utilization of resources for urgent medical triage. The triage process of 
deciding which patients should be treated first is normally based on clinical conditions 
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and treatment priorities, where the severely injured will always come first. However, the 
very resources available to conduct this triage may be unnecessarily confounded by 
large numbers of people with no immediate symptoms and possibly few long-term 
symptoms, who may still impact immediate and medium-term capability by attending 
hospitals and key nodes seeking attention and making contamination control measures 
necessary. The ‘worried well’ phenomena have been exhibited in toxic material release 
hazards such as Goiania and Tokyo (Hildebrand and Bleetman, 2007). One application 
of the work in this paper is to reduce the concerns of people who are likely to be 
minimally affected using radio or television broadcasts to announce geographical areas 
that are of minimal concern, and from where people are best not to seek attention at the 
current time. There will be apparently healthy people attending triage facilities with 
enough radiation exposure that not promptly compromise health but increases cancer 
risk. Those individuals, who with the aid of the forecasts in this work could be diverted 
away from medical facilities mainly aligned to trauma to other separate facilities 
designed to quantify and manage the radiological hazard. Minimizing unnecessary cross 
contamination to victims with open wounds is important. Radiological facilities with the 
capacity to prevent cross contamination, conduct decontamination, measure internal and 
external contamination and provide medical countermeasures rarely use similarly 
trained staff or regions of a hospital as those attending to trauma victims. The 
appropriate use of available space can be as important as the use of staff. Importantly, 
this ‘pre-triage’ would use only knowledge of where public and responders have come 
from rather than specialist medical knowledge or monitoring equipment. This allows 
further space, non-clinical staff and the public to share the triage and treatment burden 
and so hasten throughput.  
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Although the long-term risks of cancer may not greatly influence who gets 
treated first at hospital, the highly emotive perceived risk of cancer in the general 
population could have a great effect on the numbers to be triaged. This work informs 
how the triage task could be subdivided between trauma and health physics and how 
supporting staff can be most effectively used. Although trauma is a priority, there are 
often separate resources at hospitals that may not be fully utilized treating contaminated 
trauma casualties and so there would be no reason not to provide early medical 
treatment to those with greatest long-term risk of developing cancer and it would be 
socially and politically valuable to do so. 
Because the RDD scenario is likely to produce environmental contamination, the 
occupational team should ideally consider that paths taken by individuals could be 
contaminated. Since the distribution of radioactive material across the site is not 
homogeneous, different levels of exposure must be expected at different locations. The 
plans and system for medical and health response to radiation accidents may vary 
globally, but the first line is usually emergency medical personnel.  
 An RDD incident can potentially paralyze a city or state by inflicting significant 
economic, political and social impact (Rosoff and von Winterfeldt, 2007). Simulating 
such an event prior to response may provide a valuable picture of the situation, 
facilitating core activities in response, such as risk communication to the public, 
strategy and costs evaluation (Rogers et al., 2013). 
 The purpose of this study is to propose a methodology based on computer 
modeling to help plan triage procedures in the prompt response to large radiological 
emergencies aiming: a) reducing the number of individuals to be treated at first sight by 
using HotSpot code to estimate the number of individuals inside the plume and group 
them under exposure levels criteria; b) use equations from radioepidemiology to foresee 
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cancer development among affected individuals in regard to potential economic, social 
and political impact. 
 
Methods 
 
The methodology aims to integrate capabilities from different platforms, a 
procedure known as convergence, to be performed in three phases: (a) scenario 
simulation; (b) data generation and (c) risk assessment. 
 
Scenario Simulation 
 
The Health Physics HotSpot code version 3.0 was developed by the Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory – LLNL, being designed to provide a quick and portable 
tool to evaluate incidents involving radioactive material (Homann, 2013). HotSpot uses 
a conservative model to estimate the radiation dose and the concentration of 
radionuclides as a result of a release into the atmosphere (Homann, 2013; Saint Yves et 
al., 2012). The model requires less intensive computing and less time than more realistic 
platforms that may consider terrain and rain, and provides a first quantitative 
radiological description of the event useful for decision making purposes and planning. 
In this study, a simulation was performed to investigate the dispersion of 
radioactive material in a densely populated area. An RDD event was assumed to occur 
within an area which hosts major events. The main selections for HotSpot where: (a) 
general burst mode; (b) radionuclide: Cs-137; (c) activity of 3.70 x 10
14
 Bq source; (d) 
amount of explosive of 25.4 kg (10 lb) of TNT; (e) atmospheric stability class "E" and 
(f) Wind speed and direction of 3.0 m/s and 200°, respectively. 
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Data Generation 
 
The BEIR V equations for calculating a specific cancer risk were extracted from 
the Life Span Study (LSS) which is the follow-up study data obtained from a group of 
survivors of the atomic bombings events at the end of 2
nd
 World War. Measured in 
cases/100,000 individuals for the purposes of this study, the excess relative risk (ERR) 
indicates the percentage of morbidity above the baseline record for the population 
exposed to radiation. It depends on the total equivalent dose (TED) an individual 
receives, their age at exposure and sex. The radiation doses calculated with HotSpot 
were inserted into the BEIR V equations for leukemia accounting for age group and sex. 
The equations are specific for leukemia, regardless of the type (Preston et al., 2004), 
2004). The HotSpot calculations provided the location and area of plumes, and when 
combined with demographic data allow estimates to be made on the number of 
potentially compromised individuals for an arbitrary site with a typical urban 
demographic distribution. As a result, the response team could estimate the size of the 
event, as well as the necessary support and the selection criteria to be adopted in the 
triage process (prioritization). Additionally, risk assessment and communication to the 
public would be possible in a way that would positively impact their perception of risk, 
given the alternative is to rely on divergent and confusing information from the Media 
and from unofficial sources. 
Table 1 presents the equations for determining ERR for leukemia, considering: (1) 
ERR is a function of: total effective dose (D, in sieverts), latency (t, in years), age at the 
time of exposure (e, in years) and sex (s); (2) F(D) is the linear-quadratic function of 
equivalent dose, and (3) β(t,s,e) is the Excess relative risk (ERR) parameter (IAEA, 
1996). 
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TABLE 1 NEAR HERE 
 
Risk Assessment and Triage for Data Collection 
 
 A modern approach to the triage procedures of individuals in a radiological 
scenario should consider data from radiological risk assessment and consequence 
modeling. In such a scenario of environmental contamination the accumulated dose of 
radiation often has a strong spatial dependence. Thus, accurate locations of individuals 
as a function of time is important data for the medical purpose of determining doses 
accumulated along their paths of travel. 
HotSpot allows the contamination plume to be projected on the ground so that 
the affected areas can be readily identified. Those contaminated areas or sites are 
classified according to their position relatively to the plume (inner, middle and outer) 
and to the level of radiation exposure: (a) inner - high; (b) middle - moderate and (c) 
outer - low. Estimating the number of individuals coming from affected areas can be 
performed by multiplying local population density (σ) by the affected areas (A). Having 
this estimate of the number of affected individuals in each area leads to an appropriate 
distribution of resources, which speeds up the triage process. 
The ERR calculations are estimated according to dose, sex and age, and can be 
used to define various levels of risk which can be combined with position data. 
Identifying and projecting the plume area by simulation and applying the ERR 
calculations can be used to help prevent individuals from moving into dangerous areas, 
and could even be useful to help identify paths of access or evacuation routes that 
minimize the overall dose-rate time product. 
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Results 
 
 Assuming that the local population density is 5,266 inhabitants/km², a total 
amount of 9,476 individuals was predicted to be within the outer plume area. The 
corresponding data for each contaminating plume zone was calculated by defining dose 
limits of 100 mSv, 50 mSv and 1 mSv equivalent dose, respectively for areas 
contaminated by the inner, middle and outer plumes respectively. These values are the 
limits recommended by the International Atomic Energy Agency for responders (100 
mSv, 50 mSv) and public (1 mSv) (IAEA, 2006). Table 2 and 3 show the number of 
individuals in three age groups over the three plume zones and ERR by gender, age (e) 
and location (isodoses line) respectively. 
 
TABLE 2 NEAR HERE 
 
TABLE 3 NEAR HERE 
 
Discussion 
 
The simulated scenario was built based on data provided by first responders and 
then input to HotSpot. The results listed in Table 2 show that most of the population is 
located in the outer plume region, representing nearly 93.9% of the affected population, 
9,478 out of 10,100 individuals, who may not require any immediate medical 
assistance. 
Higher priority should be given to assist more seriously exposed individuals 
located in the inner and middle plumes as required by risk criteria (Reissman and 
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Howard, 2008). According to data from Table 2, the total number of individuals that are 
expected to require medical attention would be from areas affected by the middle and 
inner plumes, and would account for 6.1% of the affected population of 10,100 
individuals. Such individuals from these two innermost parts of the plume should be 
initially treated according to priorities related to sex and age, and then evaluated and 
monitored in epidemiological programs. In case of severe traumas evaluated by the 
medical staff, priority should be given without considering potential contamination 
(Division, 2010), although an assessment by radiological monitoring is recommended 
before leaving the triage area. Otherwise, higher priorities for immediate medical care 
will be given to individuals located in the inner and middle plumes, respectively (Table 
2). For each plume area, any leukemia based prioritization should be given according to 
table 3, being higher for men and younger individuals. This prioritization would 
significantly reduce the load on the triage area. However, for achieving this goal, the 
triage forms should include information on the entire path of everyone to the triage site. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The correct designation of potentially exposed individuals in a radiological 
emergency scenario has a positive impact on the allocation of resources and quality of 
medical care. The proposed combination of HotSpot and BEIR V equations according 
to convergence methodology could efficiently help improve the triage process by 
promptly providing valuable information that would aid in efforts to: (a) filter and 
reduce the number of individuals to be attended; (b) optimize the prioritization of 
medical care; (c) reduce operational costs and (d) provide the scientific data needed to 
develop an adequate approach to risk and its proper communication to the public. 
10 
 
References 
 
Akashi M, Hirama T, Tanosaki S, et al. (2001) Initial symptoms of acute radiation 
syndrome in the JCO criticality accident in Tokai-mura. Journal of Radiation 
Research 42 Suppl: S157-166. 
Division DEP. (2010) The ambulance service guidance on dealing with radiological 
incidents and emergencies. In: Guidance NEP (ed). 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130107105354/http:/www.dh.gov.u
k/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@en/@ps/documents/digitalas
set/dh_114466.pdf: NHS. 
Hendee WR. (1992) Estimation of radiation risks. BEIR V and its significance for 
medicine. Journal of the American Medical Association 268(5): 620-624. 
Hildebrand S and Bleetman A. (2007) Comparative study illustrating difficulties 
educating the public to respond to chemical terrorism. Prehospital Disaster 
Medicine 22(1): 35-41. 
Homann SG. (2013) HotSpot Health Physics Codes Version 3.0 User's Guide. CA, 
USA.: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. 
IAEA. (1996) IAEA-TECDOC-870 - Methods for Estimating the Probability of Cancer 
from Occupational Radiation Exposure. In: Section RS (ed). Vienna: IAEA. 
IAEA. (2006) Manual for First Responders to a Radiological Emergency. Incident and 
Emergency Centre. Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency. 
Mettler FA. (2012) Medical effects and risks of exposure to ionising radiation. Journal 
of Radiological Protection 32(1): N9-N13. 
Preston DL, Pierce DA, Shimizu Y, et al. (2004) Effect of recent changes in atomic 
bomb survivor dosimetry on cancer mortality risk estimates. Radiation Reseach 
162(4): 377-389. 
Reissman DB and Howard J. (2008) Responder safety and health: preparing for future 
disasters. Mount Sinai Journal of Medicine 75(2): 135-141. 
Ring JP. (2004) Radiation risks and dirty bombs. Health Physics 86(2 Suppl): S42-47. 
Rogers MB, Amlot R and Rubin GJ. (2013) The impact of communication materials on 
public responses to a radiological dispersal device (RDD) attack. Biosecurity 
and Bioterrorism 11(1): 49-58. 
Rosoff H and von Winterfeldt D. (2007) A risk and economic analysis of dirty bomb 
attacks on the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach. Risk Analysis 27(3): 533-
546. 
Saint Yves TLA, Cabral PAM, Brum T, et al. (2012) Terrorist Radiological Dispersive 
Device (RDD) Scenario and Cancer Risk Assessment. Human and Ecological 
Risk Assessment 18(5): 971-983. 
 
 
Table 1. Functions based on dose, sex, time and age for calculating the ERR for 
leukemia. The Equations for male and female are from BEIR V committee (IAEA, 
1996). 
 
MALE   
ERR(D,t,e,s) = FDβt,e,s = 0.33D+0.79D²exp-0.17t-25 e < 20 (1) 
ERR(D,t,e,s) = FDβt,e,s = 0.48D+0.79D²exp-0.13t-25 20 ≤ e < 40 (2) 
ERR(D,t,e,s) = FDβt,e,s = 1.31D+0.79D²exp-0.07t-25 e ≥ 40 (3) 
FEMALE   
ERR(D,t,e,s) = FDβt,e,s = 0.66D+0.79D²exp-0.07t-25 e < 20 (4) 
ERR(D,t,e,s) = FDβt,e,s = 0.97D+0.79D²exp-0.03t-25 20 ≤ e < 40 (5) 
ERR(D,t,e,s) = FDβt,e,s = 2.64D+0.79D²exp0.03t-25 e ≥ 40 (6) 
 
Table 2. Affected areas and the approximate number of individuals within the 
contamination plumes taken by the mathematical relation between the area (A) and the 
local population density (σ). 
 
Parameters 
Plumes 
Total (approx.) 
inner middle outer 
dose (Sv) 0.100 0.050 0.001 - 
plume area (km²) 0.032 0.086 1.8 - 
individuals 169 452 9,478 10,100 
individuals (e < 20) 45 120 2,521 2,687 
individuals (20 ≤ e < 40) 55 147 3,080 3,282 
individuals (e ≥ 40) 69 185 3,877 4,131 
 
Table 3. ERR calculated based on equations 1 to 6 by gender, age (e) and location 
(isodoses line). 
 
Parameters 
Plumes 
inner middle  outer  
sex age (years) ERR 
male 
e < 20 1.632 0.786 0.015 
20 ≤ e < 40 0.965 0.465 0.009 
e ≥ 40 0.683 0.329 0.006 
female 
e < 20 0.344 0.166 0.003 
20 ≤ e < 40 0.206 0.099 0.002 
e ≥ 40 0.145 0.070 0.001 
 
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/TIH
